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Robinson v. State 
Statements Made to Internal Affairs Division of a Police Department Are 
Discoverable Under Maryland's Version of the Jencks Doctrine 
T he Court of Appeals of Maryland held that 
statements made to the Internal Affairs 
Division of a Maryland police 
department are in the possession of 
the prosecution, and therefore 
discoverable by the defendant for 
purposes of cross-examination. 
Robinson v. State, 354 Md. 287, 730 
A.2d 181 (1999). The court found 
that statements made by two police 
officers to the Internal Affairs Division 
("lAD"), regarding the incident for 
which the petitioner was on trial, 
should have been disclosed to the 
defense for inspection of any 
exculpatory or impeaching evidence. 
The court of appeals also held that the 
trial judge erred in instructing the jury 
regarding the credibility of a witness. 
Through this holding, the court 
expanded Maryland's version of the 
Jencks doctrine to include lAD 
statements made by police officers. 
The facts of this case were in 
dispute. The State offered testimony 
from the two investigating officers that 
on January 18, 1996, two masked 
men entered a 7-11 store in 
Forestville, Maryland, and robbed the 
store at gunpoint The officers testified 
that upon reaching the 7-11 store they 
saw two masked men, one later 
identified as Ramone Robinson 
("Robinson"), exit the store and enter 
a vehicle. Officer Smith testified that 
the vehicle came straight toward him, 
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at which point he fired in the vehicle's 
direction. Corporal Hooper testified 
that shots were fired by the assailants 
at both police officers and that they 
returned:fire. The police officers both 
testified that Robinson exited the 
vehicle with a gun in his hand, 
screamed, and fired in their direction. 
The police officers fired back at 
Robinson, hitting him four times. 
Robinson testified that he did not 
play any part in the robbery of the 7-
11 store, but admitted to driving the 
vehicle involved in the incident. He 
testified that he was waiting in the 
vehicle for his friend to come out of 
the 7-11 store. Robinson stated that 
shots were fired at him as he drove 
away from the store, and that he exited 
the vehicle unarmed with his hands 
raised. 
During cross-examination of the 
police officers, defense counsel 
discovered they had given statements 
to the lAD regarding the incident. 
Defense counsel then requested the 
opportunity to determine if the lAD 
statements contained any exculpatory 
or impeaching material. Afterdenying 
the request and conducting an in 
camera review of the statements, the 
court instructed the jury that the 
officers were cleared of any 
wrongdoing, and that the lAD 
statements contained no exculpatory 
material. The jury requested the court 
to defme "exculpatory", to which the 
court answered "it means free from 
guilt ... the opposite of guilty." 
Robinson was thereafter 
convicted of assault with intent to 
murder, robbery with a dangerous 
w~apon, and other related offenses 
by a jury in the Circuit Court for 
Prince George's County. Robinson 
appealed to the court of special 
appeals, which affirmed the lower 
court's decision, holding that "the 
statement is confidential under state 
law, and developed for non-
prosecutorial purposes, and held by 
a division of a law enforcement 
agency that is not working in 
conjunction with the prosecutor." The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted certiorari. 
The court of appeals began its 
analysis by explaining the current law 
regarding disclosure of Jencks/Carr 
material. Through Carr, Maryland 
adopted the "underlying principals" 
of the United States Supreme Court's 
holding in Jencks, recognizing that 
defense counsel must be afforded the 
opportunity to effectively cross-
examine a witness to determine 
whether their testimony is inconsistent 
with prior written statements. 
Robinson, 354 Md. at 300-01,730 
A.2d at 188 (citing Jencks v. United 
States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); Carr 
v. State, 284 Md. 455, 397 A.2d 
606 (1979)). The Supreme Court in 
Jencks held that after the direct 
examination of a prosecution witness, 
defense counsel may request the 
prosecution to produce all written 
reports or statements made by the 
witness regarding their testimony. Id 
at 301, 730 A.2d at 188. 
Following the Jencks decision, 
Congress created the "Jencks Act," 
18 U.S.c. § 3500 (1994). Id at 303, 
730 A.2d at 189-90. Although 
Maryland has not wholly adopted the 
Jencks Act, Maryland courts 
frequently use it as an analytical guide. 
Id at 303, 730 A.2d at 190 (citing 
Kanaras v. State, 54 Md. App. 568, 
460 A.2d 61 (1983)). The Jencks 
Act requires that for a witness's 
statement or report to be 
discoverable, the following 
requirements must be shown: (1 ) the 
witness must testify on direct 
examination; (2) defense counsel must 
request the statement; (3) the 
statement must qualify as a 
discoverable statement; (4) the 
statement must relate to the subject 
matter of the witness's testimony; and 
(5) the statement must be in the 
possession of the prosecution. Id at 
319-20, 730 A.2d at 198. 
The court of appeals continued 
its analysis by stating thatthe only issue 
in the present case was whether the 
prosecutor was in possession of the 
officers' lAD statements, making 
them discoverable. Id at 304, 730 
A.2d at 190. The court noted that 
many courts have considered the 
police department to be an arm of the 
prosecution, therefore requiring 
prosecutors to sometimes produce 
written reports or statements in the 
department's possession. Id. 
However, because of their confidential 
nature,jurisdictions are divided on 
whether the lAD of a police 
department is part of the prosecutorial 
"arm." Id. at 305, 730 A.2d at 190. 
In the instant case, the court held that 
the lAD was part of the police 
department and, therefore, an arm of 
the prosecution. Id at 309, 730A.2d 
at 192-93. As such, the statements 
and records were in the possession 
of the police department, and 
therefore constructively in the 
possession of the prosecution. Id. 
The prosecution argued that 
because the lAD statements were 
confidential, it did not have possession 
of those statements. Id. at 306-07, 
730 A.2d at 191. In response, the 
court held that confidentiality, not 
possession, dictated whether or not 
the statements were discoverable. Id. 
at 309, 730 A.2d at 192. Moreover, 
the court must balance the 
"confidentiality interest ... against the 
confrontation and due process rights 
ofthe defendant." Id. at 309, 730 
A.2d at 193. The court also noted 
that although the lAD statements 
were confidential, the defendant's 
right to due process was fundamental, 
and therefore more important. Id at 
308, 730 A.2d at 192. (citing Chief, 
Montgomery County Dep't of 
Police v. Jacocks, 50 Md.App. 132, 
144,436 A.2d 930,936-37 (1981)). 
The court next addressed 
whether or not the trial judge's in 
camera review of the lAD statements 
was proper. Id. at 311-13, 730 A.2d 
at 193-94. The State, relying onZaal 
v. State, 326 Md. 54, 602 A.2d 
1247 (1992), and the Jencks Act, 
argued that an in camera review is 
an alternative available to the court 
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when dealing with confidential 
records. Id. at 311-12, 730 A.2d at 
1<94. The court rejected this 
argument, stating that Jencks and 
Carr held that only defense counsel 
can properly determine if statements 
contain inconsistencies for purposes 
of cross-examination. Id at 312-13, 
730 A.2d at 194-95. The court added 
that because the instant case was 
largely a credibility battle between 
Robinson and the police officers, 
defense counsel had an even greater 
need for the officers' lAD statements. 
Id. at 313, 730 A.2d at 195. As such, 
the prosecution had a legal duty to 
submit the lAD statements to the 
defense. Id at 313, 730 A.2d at 195. 
Finally, in focusing on the trial 
court's instruction to the jury 
regarding the lAD statements, the 
court concluded that it was the jury's 
task to judge the credibility of a 
witness. Id. "[T]he general rule is 
that it is error for the court to make 
remarks in the presence of the jury 
reflecting upon the credibility of a 
witness .... " Id at 314, 730 A.2d 
at 195 (citing Elmer v. State, 239 
Md. 1, 209 A.2d 776 (1965)). 
Accordingly, the court of appeals 
determined that the circuit court 
improperly instructed the jury 
regarding the officers' wrongdoing and 
the lack of exculpatory evidence in the 
lAD statements. Id. at 315-16, 730 
A.2d at 196. As a result, the court of 
appeals held that the jury instruction 
constituted prejudicial error by the trial 
court. Id. at 317, 730 A.2d at 196. 
The court's decision highlights 
the importance for defense counsel to 
have discovery available in order to 
effectively cross-examine prosecution 
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witnesses and to detennine whether 
any evidence is exculpatory. More 
importantly, the court of appeals has 
emphasized the significance of the 
defendant's due process rights when 
balanced against the confidentiality of 
the infonnation sought. This decision 
has expanded the discovery available 
to a defendant, and has thus allowed 
access to certain information that 
could change the way police officers 
are cross-examined by defense 
counsel. 
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